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a b s t r a c t 
Considered here is multi-party exploitation of common property, renewable resources. The parties play 
various dynamic games differing in degree of cooperation and commitment. Comparisons of steady states 
clarify issues on collective choice and individual welfare. 
Motivation stems from shared use of fish stocks which straddle the high seas between and in exclu- 
sive zones. An important instance, observed in the North-East Atlantic, is the object of computation and 
discussion. Not surprisingly, full cooperation yields efficiency but strategic instability. By contrast, fully 
noncooperative play comes out glaringly inefficient but stable. Interestingly, on middle ground, suitable 
quota transfers may substitute for side payments and, to tolerable measure, bring both efficiency and 
stability. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 











































Challenges as to governing the commons are ubiquitous
 Gordon, 1954; Ostrom, 1990 ). Many pressing instances turn on
hared use of renewable resources - including the environment -
or which property rights are neither well established nor local
 Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2009 ). Considered here are natural stocks,
oupled in dynamics and exploited by several parties. Motivation
omes from important, multi-nation fisheries in the North-East At-
antic – all of common but conflicting interests. 
That particular setting – alongside other instances which can
e accommodated here – fits the frames of discounted, dynamic
ames. Reasonably suppose that play unfolds in discrete time with
o end. What sort of behaviors, strategies and games ought then
e singled out? Instead of making any specific selection, we con-
ider several modes of play - each with a related solution concept.
e ask: How might diverse game instances be compared? Can
hey be ranked somehow, thereby offering views on possible im-
rovements of welfare? Motivated by our important real case, we
lso ask: Can some regime be implemented so as to Pareto domi-
ate each of the inefficient games? ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: nilsarne.ekerhovd@snf.no (N.-A. Ekerhovd), sjur.flaam@uib.no 







377-2217/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleUpon addressing these questions, we cannot preclude cooper-
tion among players – full or partial. 1 In addition, it complicates
atters that agents might be strategists in each period and over
ime. Here, however, for simplicity, suppose interaction operates
erely over time, via the system dynamics. Also for simplicity, let
ata and dynamics be deterministic – and regard the overall struc-
ure as stationary. Important issues on contracts, legal disputes, in-
titutions and governance are not addressed ( Ostrom, 1990 ). 2 Cen-
er stage is rather taken by analysis, computations and solution
oncepts. 3 
Besides operations research ( Arnason, 2009; Bjørndal, Herrero,
ewman, Romero, & Weintraub, 2012; Bjørndal, Lane, & Weintraub,
004; Lane, 1989; Ni & Sandal, 2019 ), the study relates to resource
conomics ( Hanley, Shogren, & White, 2007 ), ecology ( Huse et al.,
012; Jennings, Kaiser, & Reynolds, 2001 ), and game theory ( Finus
 Rundshagen, 2015; Kaitala, 1986; Mesterton-Gibbons, 1993; Os-
orne & Rubinstein, 1994 ). For tractable economics let all players be
rice-takers in separate factor and product markets. 4 For tractable1 Regarding incentives for cooperation, we will not straightjacket any player. Each 
hould be allowed to choose freely whether to cooperate or ”free-ride.”
2 The paper adds though to the literature on multi-national fisheries agreements, 
nd it links thereby to treaties on environmental protection ( Finus & Rundshagen, 
015 ). 
3 Even within so narrow optics, queries remains as to the stability, uniqueness 
nd viability of various arrangements or outcomes. These fall outside the scope of 
his study. 
4 This is relaxed in the sensitivity analysis. 
under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 

































































































7 ecology , we posit that population dynamics be logistic but cou-
pled. 5 
Regrettably, game theory seldom offers easy escapes from com-
plexity in agents’ behavior - whether cooperative or not ( Osborne
& Rubinstein, 1994 ). Here, either mode of play is permitted. 6 Fur-
ther, in noncooperative settings, players differ in degrees of com-
mitments. On that account, two extreme instances come straight to
the fore. One, called open-loop, relies on full commitments - this
making computation “easy” but equilibrium (subgame) imperfect.
The opposite extreme, called closed-loop , avoids commitments all
together - this making computation “hard” but equilibrium perfect
( Basar & Olsder, 1982 ). Between these polar instances, we shall also
accommodate intermediate games, marked by partial cooperation. 
To no surprise, full cooperation is marvelously efficient. More-
over, granted convexity in dynamics and preferences, solutions are
computed by single agent programming. However, absent suitable
side payments, the attending recommendations are difficult to im-
plement. By contrast, closed-loop, non-cooperative play is often
grossly inefficient – and harder to compute - but rather easily im-
plemented by the players themselves. 
Links extend to several strands of literature. So, the study ad-
dresses diverse readers. Included are operation researchers, re-
source economists and game theorists. General terms connect to
dynamic programming ( Ross, 1993 ) and recursive methods ( Stokey
& Lucas, 2011 ) as well as to discounted, dynamic games ( Amir,
1996; Sundaram, 1989 ). More specific themes, on resource eco-
nomics ( Hanley et al., 2007 ), bridge between tragedies of the com-
mons – via prisoners’ dilemma – to full cooperation. Broadly, un-
der one umbrella, the study covers open-access fisheries ( Gordon,
1954 ), fish wars ( Levhari & Mirman, 1980 ), and governance of the
commons ( Ostrom, 1990 ). 
Novelties come with accommodating various games, by com-
paring them for efficiency and welfare – and finally, by computa-
tions for specific fisheries. 
The paper is planned as follows. Section 2 fixes nota-
tions and provides preliminaries. Section 3 formalizes various
discounted, dynamic games. Section 4 attempts to compare
them. Section 5 specializes to fishery games. For application,
Section 6 considers multi-nation use of several stocks, each strad-
dling the North-East Atlantic. Section 7 outlines the indicative re-
sults. In Section 8 , following a discussion of the initial results, we
propose an alternative way to redistribute the benefits from coop-
eration. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Notations and preliminaries 
To set the stage, this section briefly describes states , players, sys-
tem dynamics , and any player’s single-period payoff (or profit) as
well as his overall objective . 
The state x of the system belongs to - and evolves in - a non-
empty, compact, convex set X ⊂ R S + , referred to as the commons .
S is a finite list of renewable stocks. Component s ∈ S of a vec-
tor (x s ) = x ∈ X reports the abundance (biomass) x s ∈ R + of species
s . The ambient Euclidean space R S is ordered in the customary,
component-wise manner. 
Time t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T } is discrete. Occasionally, for computations or
recursions, the horizon T is finite, but - unless stated otherwise - in
the main, T = + ∞ . Let x t = (x st ) ∈ X denote the system state which
prevails at the beginning of time period t . That state is perfectly
observed by each concerned party. 5 That specification is, however, not essential for the subsequent frame. 
6 Few studies address multi-nation, multi-species fisheries as non-cooperative 
games. For (notable) exceptions, see Doyen, Cisse, Sanz, F Blanchard, and Péreau 




Players form a fixed, finite ensemble I , # I ≥ 2 . The members are
conomic agents, all infinitely-lived and interacting at each time t .
o avoid repetitions of arguments, by slight abuse of terms, call
ny non-empty subset I ⊆ I a coalition . A coalition I is cohesive
f the aggregate non-cooperative payoff does not exceed the coali-
ional one ( Eyckmans & Finus, 2004 ). I is declared internally stable
f no member, ceteris paribus, has incentives to leave ; it’s externally
table if no outside agent wants to join ( D’Aspremont, Jacquemin,
abszewicz, & Weymark, 1983 ). 
The action of agent i ∈ I , at any time t , is to catch or con-
ume some “quantity” q it ∈ Q i ⊂ R S + from the commons. The set
 i is compact convex and contains 0. For later purposes, write
 := i ∈ I Q i and Q −i :=  j  = i Q j . 
Dynamics are deterministic and time-homogenous. For succinct
tatement, briefly omit mention of time here. So, single-period, ag-
regate catch q I := i ∈ I q i , taken out of the commons in state x ,
eaves end-of-period, after-catch escapement χ = x − q I . Such in-
estment or saving generates gross growth 
∈ X 	→ G (χ ) ∈ X. (1)
hus, endowment x = G (χ ) becomes available, and is commonly
bserved, at the beginning of the subsequent period. Like standard
roduction functions, let the mapping G (1) be concave, continuous
nd increasing (jointly and component-wise). 
Single-period payoff or profit to agent i is a function 
(x, q i ) ∈ X × Q i 	→ πi (x, q i ) ∈ R. (2)
y economic considerations, π i ( x , q i ) is presumed continuous,
ence bounded, 7 jointly concave, strictly so in q i - and separately
ncreasing in x . 
The objective of agent i , as of any time t , in face then of state
 = x t ∈ X, is to maximize his actualized value 





πi (x τ , q iτ ) (3)
ver the periods to go. He uses a fixed discount factor δi ∈ [0 , 1) . 8 
learly, the value v it (x ) (3) is not well defined unless q j τ be spec-
fied - or perfectly predicted - for each rival player j  = i and time
≥ t . 
Bounded value functions v : X → R form a real vector space V .
hat space is complete with norm ‖ v ‖ := sup x ∈ X | v (x ) | . 9 
Values to a coalition are recursively defined by foreseeing the
hoices made by rival players. That is, if state x = x t prevails at
ime t , and coalition I ⊆ I predicts the aggregate quantity q −I :=
 
j / ∈I q jt , immediately taken by the outsiders j / ∈ I, then I can aim
t joint value 
 I,t (x ) = sup 
q I 
{ πI (x, q I ) + δI v I , t+1 (x +1 ) } (4)
ith x +1 = G (x − q I − q −I ) . Here, δI ∈ [0 , 1) is a common discount
actor, and - as a matter of perfect cooperation: 
I (x, q I ) := sup 
{ ∑ 
i ∈I 
πi (x, q i ) : 
∑ 
i ∈I 
q i = q I , q i ∈ Q i 
} 
. (5)
The convention sup ∅ = −∞ applies in (4) and (5) . 10 Format
4) invites dynamic programming with finite horizon T and speci-
ed terminal value function v I,T +1 (·) . This assumption, maintained until other notice, is problematic if lim π i ( x , q i ) 
ends to −∞ when some x s approaches its extinction level. 
8 With no loss of generality, one may suppose that every value function v i (·) be 
on-negative. This feature is, however, not important in any subsequent arguments. 
9 In terms of functional analysis, V is a Banach space. 
10 It’s a conceptual devise to account for infeasibility. For practical purposes, one 
an replace −∞ by any number < ∑ i ∈I min πi (x, q i ) . 






































































































11 Thus, 	 accommodates # I + 2 different frames. Moreover, some can be played 
in either open or closed loop. If each rival j / ∈ I commits to state-independent, open-loop play
	→ q j τ ∈ Q j from some time t < T onwards, then, most conveniently,
he function v I,t (·) becomes concave and increasing on its effective
omain { x ∈ X : v I,t (x ) ∈ R } . 
By contrast, if each rival j / ∈ I implements a stationary, closed-
oop policy x ∈ X 	→ q j ( x ) ∈ Q j , it becomes harder to have v I,t (·) con-
ave increasing. However, as recompense, under such play, with
 = + ∞ , recursion (4) takes the time-invariant form 
 ∈ X 	→ v I (x ) = max 
q I 
{ πI (x, q I ) + δI v I (x +1 ) } (6)
here x +1 = G (x − q I −
∑ 
j / ∈I q j (x )) and (5) remains in vigor. Then
oreover, v I is the unique fixed point of the contraction operator 
 ∈ V 	→ T v ∈ V, defined by 
 T v ](x ) := max 
q I 
{ πI (x, q I ) + δI v (x +1 ) } ∀ x ∈ X. 
f each q j ( · ) is continuous, so is also v I (·) . 
It is, of course, conceivable that agents play open-loop up to
ome interim time t < T and shift then to closed-loop strategies.
owever, given the stationary setting, such switching of behavioral
odus will not be considered. 
emark. ( on single-period allocation of catch ). Given any state x ∈ X ,
ubproblem (5) might be solved by direct exchanges ( Flåm, 2016a ),
arkets ( Flåm, 2019 ) or double auctions ( Flåm, 2021 ) for quotas.
ote that any shadow price P ∈ ∂ 
∂q I 
πI (x, q I ) on ”quotas”, alongside
ny efficient allocation (q i ) i ∈I of fixed aggregate q I , yields 
 ∈ ∂ 
∂q i 
πi (x, q i ) and 
 i ∈ arg max { πi (x, ̃  qi ) − P · ˜ qi : ˜ qi ∈ Q i } ∀ i ∈ I. 
. Discounted, dynamic games 
This section singles out four game forms - ordered by de-
reasing degree of coordination and commitment. They range
rom perfect cooperation - via single-agent defection and Nash non-
ooperative play - to the extreme instance of myopic fish wars . 
Perfect cooperation emerges when the grand coalition I = I,
pon facing any state x 0 ∈ X , decides to shoot at maximal joint
alue v I (x 0 ) . In this optic, granted a stationary structure, the dis-
inction between open and closed loop disappears. Thus, format
4) coincides with (6) . Consequently, for computation, one may fix
 distant horizon T < + ∞ and solve a representative agent’s prob-
em 
 I (x 0 ) ≈ max 
(q It ) 
T ∑ 
t=0 
δt I πI (x t , q It ) . (7)
lternatively, initiating with any bounded concave proposal v I :
 → R, iterated updates (6) : 
 I (x ) ← − max 
q I 
{ πI (x, q I ) + δI v I (x +1 ) } 
onverge to the correct function v I (·) - whence the particular value
 I (x 0 ) comes up. For each approach and stage, the function πI 
5) applies with I = I. 
Granted convex dynamics and preferences - and no randomness
 we prefer problem format (7) to iterated value updates - for three
easons: First , (7) amounts to tractable concave programming; sec-
nd , it automatically takes care of single-period allocation (5) - and
hird , it avoids paying much attention to states never visited. 
Single-player defection means that one agent i refrains from all
orts of cooperation or commitment, leaving such concerns entirely
o others. Let −i := I{ i } denote the residual ensemble, comprising
t least two members who cooperate perfectly. On this premise,uppose the defector free-rides, relegating the task of intertempo-
al allocation to the coalition. Specifically, when facing whatever
tate x ∈ X , the single defector i chooses 
 i (x ) := arg max 
q i 
πi (x, q i ) , (8)
hereby behaving as though δi = 0 . As upshot, he plays predictable
losed-loop, performing thus as a short-sighted, strategic dummy
 somewhat like a Stackelberg follower. Consequently, up front,
oalition −i faces either the reduced, single-shot problem 
 −i (x 0 ) ≈ max 
(q −it ) 
T ∑ 
t=0 
δt −i π−i (x t , q −it , q i (x t )) (9)
or distant planning horizon T < + ∞ , or the task of iterated, recur-
ive programming 
 −i (x ) ← − max 
q −i 
{ π−i (x, q −i ) + δ−i v −i (G (x − q −i − q i (x )) } . 
n both cases the joint, single-period payoff π−i (x, q −i ) is de-
ned by (5) with I = −i = Ii. Note that the objective of problem
9) can lack (or loose) concavity - whence become less amenable 
han that of (7) . 
Noncooperative play in which each player i ∈ I implements a
losed-loop, stationary strategy x ∈ X 	→ q i ( x ) ∈ Q i is most difficult to
andle; see Amir (1996) , Levy (2015) , and Sundaram (1989) . Yet -
iscretizing X , Q and modifying G accordingly - attractive compu-
ation may rely on iterated linear programming as follows: Given
ny tentatively proposed strategy profile x 	→ q ( x ) ∈ Q , 




x ∈ X 
v i (x ) s.t. v i (x ) 
≥ max 
q i ∈ Q i 
{ πi (x, q i ) + δi v i (G (x − q i − q −i (x ))) } ∀ x ∈ X. (10) 
• Update his strategy by letting q i ( x ) equal the maximizing
hoice in state x . 
• Continue , by some protocol, to select a player until conver-
ence. 
Alternatively, by a diagonal procedure, iteratively update value
 i (x ) and best choice q i ( x ) - as in (6) with I = { i } . 
Note that the same two approaches serve for perfect coopera-
ion and single-agent defection . Moreover, either can accommodate
tochastic dynamics. 
Myopic fish wars emerge if each player i ∈ I , whenever he faces
ny state x , implements (8) . Broadly, everybody behaves as though
i = 0 . This rent-dissipating scenario is thoroughly analyzed, all too
requently seen, and much deplored ( Clark, 1990; Gordon, 1954;
strom, 1990 ). 
. Comparison of games 
Introduced above was an ensemble 
:= { per fect cooperation, single − agent de fections, 
Nash noncooperati v e } (11) 
f labels γ in capital. 11 Can the said games somehow be compared,
rdered or ranked? To that end, suppose each game γ ∈ 	 leads to
 stable, long-run, steady state x γ – held up by a corresponding
tationary strategy q γ ( x γ ) ∈ Q . On this presumption, let us say that
ame ˆ γ Pareto dominates γ written 
ˆ  γ iff v ˆ γ (x ˆ γ ) ≥ v γ (x γ ) for each i ∈ I. 

















































































12 If Q is (e is | x s ) comes linear in x s , concerns with possible extinction of species s 
become particularly pressing. 
13 Generalization to Cournot oligopoly is possible, but not considered here; see 
Flåm (2016b) . 
14 Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Russia as well as various 
members of the EU participate. Their status—as coastal states or distant water 
exploiters—varies across species. Further, a game γ̄ ∈ 	 is declared strictly Pareto efficient to level
λ∈ (0, 1] iff
λv γ̄
i 
(x γ̄ ) ≥ v γ
i 
(x γ ) for each i ∈ I and γ  = γ̄ . (12)
It is commonly observed that non-cooperative play entails inef-
ficiencies – reminiscent of the prisoners’ dilemma . So, to no sur-
prise, perfect cooperation serves as goal and benchmark game,
henceforth labelled γ̄ . However, being difficult to implement, that
game calls for compromises. For this purpose, given any steady
state x ∈ X , upheld by a constant profile q ∈ Q , let v i (x ) denote the
attending present value which would accrue then to agent i . 
Definition 1. (on implementation). A steady state x ∈ X , and
associated constant profile q ∈ Q , implements a game γ̄ ∈ 	
up to level λ∈ (0, 1] iff
v i (x ) ≥ λv γ̄i (x γ̄ ) f or each i ∈ I. (13)
Clearly, for each player to find a steady state x attractive, the level
λ in question must not be far from 1. 
Proposition 1. (on steady state implementation). Suppose coopera-
tive game γ̄ ∈ 	 satisfies (12) . Then, any steady state x which im-
plements γ̄ up to level λ (13) satisfies 
v i (x ) ≥ λv γ̄i (x γ̄ ) ≥ v 
γ
i 
(x γ ) f or each i ∈ I and γ  = γ̄ . 
Returning now to game ensemble 	 (11) , we computed steady
states for perfect cooperation and the single-agent defections as long-
run limits of single-shot programs ( 7 ) and (9) – emanating from var-
ious initial states x 0 . 
The more challenging, Nash noncooperative instance stands out. It-
erated linear programming (10) or repeated value updates ( 6 ) may
both indicate the steady state. It is more tempting though, to seek
that state directly by applying individual optimality conditions to a
rest point. For that, suppose a steady pair ( x , q ) be interior to X × Q.
Presuming differentiability, the state x ∈ int(X) and associated profile
i 	→ q i ∈ int(Q i ) should then solve the following equation system: 
For time-invariant best choice q i of player i ∈ I , 
∂ 
∂q i 
πi (x, q i ) = δi v ′ i (x ) 
∂ 
∂q i 
G (x − q I ) with v ′ i (x ) = 
∂ 
∂x 
πi (x, q i ) , 
(14)
and for a time-invariant pair ( x , q ), 
x = G (x − q I ) with q I = 
∑ 
i ∈ I 
q i . (15)
Eq. (15) explain themselves. The first equation in (14) derives from dif-
ferentiating the bracket on the right hand side of the Bellman equa-
tion 
v i (x ) = max 
q i ∈ Q i 
{ πi (x, q i ) + δi v i (G (x − q I )) } 
with respect to q i . The second equation in (14) stems from the
envelope theorem - as applied in this context by Benveniste and
Scheinkman ( 1979 ). 
5. Competitive fishery games 
For application, consider harvest from common fish species
s ∈ S . A box 
X := [ x , ̄x ] := 
{
x ∈ R S : x ≤ x ≤ x̄ 
}
serves as state space. It features a lower level x ∈ R S + , below which
the system is not viable. The upper level x̄ >> x reflects the carry-
ing capacities of the habitat. 
In practice and any period, no agent makes q i ∈ Q i ⊆X his chief
decision vector. Rather, his catch q from species s , derives fromis ffort e is , expressly directed at that species. Thus, effort e is - as
art of his primary, single-period decision - is chosen within a
rescribed, compact convex set E is (x s ) ⊂ R + , containing 0. In these
erms, let 
 is = Q is (e is | x s ) , (16)
here production function (e is , x s ) 	→ Q is (e is | x s ) is jointly contin-
ous, strictly concave and increasing. Naturally, Q is (0 | x s ) = 0 , and
 s < x s ⇒ q is = Q is (e is | x s ) = 0 . 12 Given x s ≥ x s , there is a one-to-
ne mapping q is ↔ e is defined by (16) and the partial inverse func-
ion Q −1 
is 
(·| x s ) , to the effect that 
 is = Q −1 is (q is | x s ) . 
gent i takes home single-period payoff
i (x, q i ) := 
∑ 
s ∈ S 
πis (x s , q is ) 
here 
is (x s , q is ) := 
{
p is q is − c is (e is ) : e is = Q −1 is (q is | x s ) 
}
. (17)
ere, p is denotes a competitive market price per quantitative unit
f species s . 13 c is ( · ) accounts for the agent’s cost of effort. To the
xtent that x s affects (16) , payoff depends indirectly on stock abun-
ance. Like above, let χ := x − ∑ i ∈ I q i denote escapement which
enerates concave, increasing gross growth (1) . 
There are, of course, concerns with system viability. It causes
o worries that χ s comes close to x̄ s . By contrast, as a minimal
nd natural requirement, suppose 
s ↘ x s ⇒ e is (and hence q is ) ↘ 0 for all i. 
eflecting on this, given state x ∈ X , then - by tacit assumption, out-
ide regulation, or fishermens’ own concerns with profitability and
ustainability - the catch profile q = (q i ) ∈ Q always satisfies the
easibility restriction 
:= x − q I := [ x s −
∑ 
i ∈ I 
q is ] s ∈ S ∈ X. (18)
nclusion (18) would automatically hold if either 
∗ prudent agents foresee catastrophes if χ s < x s - whence hold
ack on effort - or 
∗ payoffs become negative at low stock levels, at which some
layers would exit the game. 
In sum, for computations, it’s convenient to let effort s e is ∈
 is (x s ) be the basic, single-period decisions. Accordingly, to elim-
nate quantity q is as companion variable, let harvest fractions
 is ( · ) ≥ 0, 
∑ 
i ∈ I f is (·) = 1 be defined implicitly by (16) , q Is := i ∈ I q is ,
nd 
 is = f is (e is | x s ) q Is . 
. Application 
Nation ensemble I := {Iceland, Norway, and UK} 14 harvest and
hare fish species s ∈ S := {herring, mackerel, and blue whiting}. The
sheries are of considerable commercial importance, and the
tocks straddle the North-East Atlantic, various exclusive economic
ones (EEZ) and the high seas ( Bjørndal, 2009; Bjørndal & Eker-
ovd, 2014 ). 
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t  The species impact each other by feeding on the same lower-
evel strata ( Huse et al., 2012 ). All forage on the plankton Calanus
nmarchicus - itself of limited commercial interest. Its abundance—
egarded as exogenous here—largely links and determines the dy-
amics of the three stocks. By assumption, predator species have
nsignificant impacts. 
The three stocks are coupled in dynamics, of contested exploita-
ion - and some species even might collapse ( Bjørndal, Kaitala, Lin-
roos, & Munro, 20 0 0; Ekerhovd, 2010; Hannesson, 2013; Spijkers
 Boonstra, 2017; Toumasatos & Steinshamn, 2018 ). It is feared that
he mackerel stock will outcompete the other two - thereby up-
nding environmental and economic sustainability. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the stylized web structure, sometimes called
The Norwegian Sea pelagic complex” ( Ekerhovd & Kvamsdal,
017 ). 
Given after-catch escapement χs ∈ [ x s , ̄x s ] of species s and ag-
regate biomass χ S := s ∈ S χ s , the ensuing gross growth G s ( · ) of
pecies s is logistic: 
(χs ) =: χ 	→ G s (χ ) = χs + r s χs (1 − χS /k ) =: x s . 
Here k > 0 denotes the habitat’s maximal, carrying capacity, fur-
ished by lower-level, ecological strata, supposed independent and
table. If isolated and viable, species s would grow at linear rate
 s > 0. The lower levels x s , below which the system is not viable,
re fixed, for each species, at reference minimum biomass levels
ecommended by the International Council for the Exploration of
he Seas (ICES, 2016 ). At stock escapement biomass levels below
hese limits catch is nil. 15 
Agent i ′ s harvest from stock s at time t is 
 ist = 
e ist 
e st 
q st = e ist 
e st + 1 x st 
here e st := i ∈ I e ist denotes aggregate effort directed at species s ,
nd 
 st = e st 
e st + 1 x st . 
he constant 1 in the denominator acts as unit of effort and nor-
alizing factor. 16 Consequently, agent i directs effort 
 ist = 
q ist 
x st − q st 
15 The minimum escapement levels are presented in Table 1 . 
16 The constant could have been replaced by coefficients dependent on both eco- 
ogical parameters (e.g. interspecies) and on economic parameters (e.g. preference) 
 Doyen et al., 2019 ). Here such features are captured through other elements of the 





owards species s at time t . 
.1. Parametrization 
Parameters, drawn from empirically based information, are
ummarized in Table 1 , while the relevant data and estimation
tatistics are in Appendix . 
The ICES provides data on stock sizes and harvest levels (ICES,
016 ). The Norwegian purse seiners’ cost and harvest data comes
rom the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries’ profitability survey
n the Norwegian fishing fleet for 1998–2011 ( Fiskeridirektoratet,
012 ). Historic stocks development is not observed directly, but de-
ived from stock assessments. The stock data are generated using
irtual population analysis, rich in its coverage of catch, mortal-
ty, and stock size information. Mortality and stock size series are
enerated variables based on biological assumptions, actual catch
evels, and assumed decay functions ( Jennings et al., 2001 ). It is
roblematic that generated regressors are endogenous, and a least
quare estimator produces inconsistent and inefficient estimates.
herefore, we use instrumental variable techniques to address this
ssue ( Ekerhovd & Gordon, 2013; Ekerhovd & Kvamsdal, 2017; Eker-
ovd & Steinshamn, 2016 ). The data used, covering the years 1998–
010, are presented in Table A1 . 
The growth functions are derived from the multi-species model
 s , which consist of three regression equations, each having their
wn dependent growth variable and a set of exogenous explana-
ory variables. Each equation could be estimated separately. How-
ver, the equations are clearly related by the fact that the sum of
ll three escapement levels are a common component of an ex-
lanatory variable in the equations. Moreover, the common carry-
ng capacity parameter, k , links the equations in a nonlinear way.
herefore, the multi-species model was estimated using a nonlin-
ar, seemingly unrelated regression. The estimated parameters, r s 
nd k , are listed in Table A2 . 
Lacking information on total costs for the combined harvest of
erring, mackerel, and blue whiting, we used the available oper-
tion costs (1998–2010) for licensed Norwegian purse seiners in
illion NOK (see Table A1 ). Prices and cost for UK and Iceland, on
he other hand, were not obtained from empirical estimates, but
nstead scaled to the Norwegian prices and costs based on infor-omewhat ad hoc , it generates though, qualitative properties that appear robust; 
amely that catch rates are higher if the fish population is larger, and that the total 
atch rate is increasing and concave in effort. 
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Table 1 
Model subscripts, variables, and parameters. 
Symbol Definition Herring Mackerel Blue Whiting Unit 
s Subscript 1 2 3 Stock/fishery 
t Time Year 
Norway 
i Actor United Kingdom (UK) Nationality 
Iceland 
r s Growth rate .358 .589 .808 
k Carrying capacity 27,462 Thousand tonnes 
x s Minimum escapment 2500 1,800 650 Thousand tonnes 
Prices, Norway 3.55 9.48 1.54 Norwegian kroner (NOK) 
p si Prices, UK 3.02 8.30 2.05 
Prices, Iceland 1.53 2.37 1.03 
c s Cost parameter 15,655,111 16,886,829 1,154,117 Thousand NOK (2010) 
Table 2 
Sum profit 10 6 NOK a over 20 years in steady state for various 
coalition structures. 
Country b NO UK ICE Total 
Coalition structure 
Fully cooperative 509.5 1.8 −11.6 499.7 
(ICE,UK), (NO) 36.2 10.3 0.2 46.7 
(ICE,NO), (UK) 42 7.4 0.9 50.3 
(UK,NO), (ICE) 143.2 1.4 0.3 144.9 
Fully non-cooperative 39.8 7.3 1 48.1 
a Norwegian kroner (NOK) 




























Coalitions and their stability properties. 
Case Leaving/entering 
coalition/nation 
Coalition structure Int/ext stable 
1 (NO,UK,ICE) a (NO,UK,ICE) no/yes 
2 (UK,ICE) (UK,ICE),(NO) no/no 
3 (NO) (UK,ICE),(NO) yes/ yes 
4 (NO,ICE) (NO,ICE),(UK) no/no 
5 (UK); (NO,ICE),(UK) yes/no 
6 (NO,UK) (NO,UK),(ICE) no/yes 
7 (ICE) (NO,UK),(ICE) yes/no 
8 (NO) (NO),(UK),(ICE) yes/yes 
9 (UK) (NO),(UK),(ICE) yes/no 
10 (ICE) (NO),(UK),(ICE) yes/no 
a Norway (No), United Kingdom (UK), and Iceland (ICE). 
Table 4 
Harvest levels by country a and stock biomass b under various coalition 
structures. 
Coalition structure Species NO UK ICE Stock 
(NO,UK,ICE) Herring 0 0 363 2863 
Mackerel 3147 0 0 16,309 
Blue Whiting 0 213 0 863 
(ICE,UK),(NO) Herring 965 0 337 6526 
Mackerel 617 312 0 3196 
Blue Whiting 121 360 0 1337 
(ICE,NO),(UK) Herring 1179 152 0 6662 
Mackerel 636 312 0 3257 
Blue Whiting 0 138 243 1060 
(UK,NO),(ICE) Herring 1209 0 0 6325 
Mackerel 1385 0 0 4948 
Blue Whiting 0 238 113 1006 
(NO),(UK),(ICE) Herring 1046 101 173 6603 
Mackerel 654 288 0 3,231 
Blue Whiting 0 201 205 1,126 
a Norway (No), United Kingdom (UK), and Iceland (ICE). 














I  mation from other sources ( Lappo, 2013 ). The background for this
is discussed in more detail in Appendix . 
The Norwegian purse seiners’ ( NO ) effort in fishery s at time
(year) t indicates the relationship between their harvest, q sNOt ,
and final escapement level, χ st . Hence, the effort, e sNOt = q sNOt /χst ,
(cf. Eq. (6) ) was regressed on the Norwegian purse seiners’ costs
for 1998–2010. The results from the cost function calibration are
shown in Table A3 . 
Accordingly, we scaled UK and Icelandic costs and prices to the
Norwegian parameters in the following way: For the costs we de-
cided to scale the Icelandic costs to the Norwegian cost parame-
ters, cf. Table 1 , by a factor of 0.5; for the UK, the fisheries costs are
assumed equal to the Norwegian costs (factor = 1.0). Similarly, the
Norwegian mean prices and UK and Icelandic prices were scaled
accordingly and are presented in Table 1 . 
7. Results and sensitivity 
This section provides net present values from each coalition
structure - and explores sensitivity to selected parameters. 
7.1. Results 
We posit that δi ≈ 1 for each i ∈ I . The optimization problem is
solved using KNITRO in a GAMS environment. Each computational
run extends over 25 years, and the profits are summed across the
last 20 years, the system then being close to a steady state. The
latter is achieved by running the relevant model twice, using the
tentative steady-state already found in the first run as the ini-
tial state to the second. Table 2 lists each nation’s undiscounted,
steady-state payoffs in the three different regimes: fully coopera-
tive, partially cooperative, and, finally, completely non-cooperative.
With just three players, five coalition structures are possible. 
Table 2 indicates some stability properties of various arrange-
ments. Table 3 clarifies these matters. 
Harvest patterns are summarized in Table 4 . Note that the co-
operative case that stands out both with respect to stock compo-
sition and harvest composition. Norway takes more than 3 milliononnes mackerel out of a stock larger than 16.3 million tonnes. The
erring stock is less than half of what it is in the other cases, the
lue whiting stock is below 1 million tonnes, whereas the mack-
rel stock is more than twice as high. In all other cases, the herring
tock varies around 6.5 million tonnes, the mackerel stock varies a
it more from 3.2 to 5 million tonnes, whereas the blue whiting
tock varies from 1 to 1.3 million tonnes. 
Not surprisingly, the grand coalition is internally unstable. Ice-
and wants to break out because its payoff is negative. Further - or
fterwards - UK wants to leave as well. In the first place, Iceland
ight already foresee the ensuing collapse of coalitions. What fi-
ally emerges, via actions and reactions, is a largest consistent so-
ution, reflecting farsighted stability; see Chwe (1994) . Here, since
celand fares best alone and will leave behind an internally unsta-
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Table 5 
Actual harvest levels by country a and spawning stock 
biomass assessment b in 2014 and 2015. 
Year Species NO UK ICE Stock 
2014 Herring 263 4 59 5,154 
Mackerel 278 288 173 5,229 
Blue Whiting 399 27 183 4,050 
2015 Herring 176 0 43 4,798 
Mackerel 242 248 169 5,195 
Blue Whiting 489 31 214 4,229 
a Norway (No), United Kingdom (UK), and Iceland (ICE). 
b Harvest levels and stock biomass in thousand tonnes 


















































































































n  le coalition, what results is the fully non-cooperative regime. As
bserved in reality, cooperation appears unlikely ( Table 3 , cases 8,
, and 10), no matter which coalition structure we start with. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen from the stability analysis
bove, full noncooperative competition is the most likely outcome.
t is therefore interesting to compare the different outcomes from
he model with what we actually see in reality. 
Actual stocks and harvests in 2014 and 2015 are shown in
able 5 . It is seen that these numbers are much closer to the cases
ith at least one singleton than with the cooperative case. The ac-
ual herring stock is around 5 million tonnes which is compara-
le to the 6.5 million tonnes found in most cases except the grand
oalition. Mackerel and blue whiting stocks vary around 5.2 and
.1 million tonnes, respectively. The real mackerel stock is, in other
ords, much lower than the 16 million tonnes advocated in the
ooperative case, but comparable to the stock found in the cases
ith one singleton, which varies from 3.2 to 4.9 million tonnes,
f. Table 4 . Blue whiting, being the least profitable stock, is in the
eal world not fished down in order to accommodate the two other
tocks but is also around 4 million tonnes. In the model runs, blue
hiting varies between 1 and 2 million tonnes, and is highest in
he cooperative case, cf. Table 4 . 
When it comes to harvest, the real world pattern seen from
able 5 indicates that Norway harvests all three species, UK spe-
ializes in mackerel and Iceland specializes in mackerel and blue
hiting. It is difficult to find exactly this pattern with any of the
oalition structures. The cooperative case is perhaps the one that
s furthest away from it. In reality also other nations harvest on
hese stocks, and the true figures are therefore lower than the re-
ults from the model, as in the model we assume that only these
hree nations harvest. 
Unsurprisingly, full cooperation largely avoids the non-
ooperative tragedy. Indeed, full cooperation offers 10 times
reater profit than the non-cooperative regime. Thus, if suitable
haring rules—or feasible side payments—are implemented, the
tability criteria are apt to become different. Then, Iceland helps
thers harvest more mackerel. If side payments were possible,
he grand coalition might become stable. Norway and UK might
hen pay Iceland to harvest (mainly) more herring. Unfortunately,
onetary side payments between fishing nations have hardly
een observed. By contrast, negotiation over quotas or access to
ach others waters are more common. We have therefore used the
odel to suggest some relatively undramatic transfers of quotas
etween agents that surprisingly closely mimic the cooperative
ase and simultaneously restore stability. These are detailed later. 
.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we present the results of sensitivity analysis with
espect to some of the main economic parameters. More specifi-
ally, we look at the discount factor, the cost parameters and the
rice. Regarding price, we investigate the effect of diverging fromhe hypothesis that all are price-takers, and look at the case where
here is some degree of market power. A more detailed descrip-
ion of the sensitivity analysis is relegated to Appendix . The main
esults are summarized below. 
A stable second-best solution, not very far from the first-best,
till exists under 10% discounting. We have also investigated the
ffect of discounting on the intermediate cases (coalitions of two
nd one singleton) and get the same results, namely only marginal
uantitative effects and no qualitative effects. 
The cost per unit effort is assumed to be the same between
pecies, due to similar technology, but vary between nations. In
he main analysis Norway and UK have the same cost whereas Ice-
and has 50% lower cost. As Norway already is the most profitable
ountry, we do not see any point in reducing its cost. Instead, we
aried the UK and Icelandic cost factors, one at the time ceteris
aribus , by 10%. The results, comparable to Table 2 , are presented
n Tables A4 and A5 for UK and Iceland, respectively. 
We find that a change in the cost parameter to some extent
ffects the profitability of the country for which the cost parameter
s altered, but not very much, and for the other two countries there
s hardly any effect at all. 
Basically, other properties of the solutions such as the stability
f the grand coalition and the most likely outcome of the game,
nd as discussed in detail later, cooperation and the division of la-
or, and partial cooperation and efficiency, appears robust to rea-
onable changes in the relative cost differences between countries.
With both agent- and species-specific prices we have already
ine different prices. The possible number of combinations for
hanging the prices is very high, and we do not see any point in
tarting to try out all these combinations. Instead we look at a case
here one agent has market power for one of the species. As Nor-
ay’s catch of mackerel is among the largest catches, and in ad-
ition mackerel is the economically most important species, this
ccur as an obvious case of possible market power to be analyzed.
t is assumed that the other two countries remain price-takers, so
oes Norway for herring and blue whiting. 
All in all, replacing the fixed price by a downward sloping de-
and function does not make very significant changes, and the
hanges that are noticeable are as expected, see Appendix for de-
ails. 
. Discussion 
Full cooperation emphazises efficiency in allocation and sharing.
onsequently, that paradigm brings out division of labor or spe-
ialization of tasks. Parties, enjoying comparative advantages in lo-
ation or payoffs, concentrate on different stocks, cf. Table 4 . Best
ituated agents harvest relatively more, and sharper selection mir-
ors differences in migration patterns. A feedback mechanism rein-
orces these features. Indeed, the most profitable stock (i.e. mack-
rel) grows better if the others be held down. In extremis, Iceland
atches herring, Norway mackerel, and UK blue whiting. Thereby,
celand incurs losses; it suppresses the herring stock to accommo-
ate more mackerel, mainly to the benefit of Norway. 
Partial cooperation , somewhat surprisingly, does not necessarily
mprove efficiency. To wit, if Norway free-rides, while Iceland and
K cooperate, total net revenue is less than under full lack of co-
peration ( Eq. (10) ). Broadly, if the best-placed party free-rides in
ace of cooperation among its rivals, that party may deepen the
ragedy of the commons. 
On collapse of stocks – a potential and serious threat here -
wo things stand out. First , each species is partly protected by high
arvest costs under low abundance. Yet all remain vulnerable by
oving in schools; the herring stock already provided striking il-
ustration. Second , if one species is markedly more valuable, eco-
omic rationality may drive the other species (close) to extinction.
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Table 6 
Steady-state profits 10 6 NOK a over 20 years under competi- 
tion/cooperation with/without quota transfers. 
Country b NO UK ICE Total 
Coalition structure: 
Fully cooperative 509.5 1.8 −11.6 499.7 
Cooperative with transfer 478.3 10.3 1.0 489.6 
Fully non-cooperative 39.8 7.3 1.0 48.1 
a Norwegian Kroner (NOK). 









































































































a  In principle, the fully cooperative scenario can threaten ecological
diversity. On this account, we observe that minimal escapement
( x ) binds under cooperation, otherwise not. Paradoxically, the non-
cooperative regime safeguards the system’s dimensionality and di-
versity; economic rationality impacts two stocks negatively. 
Practical management points to Norway and UK as the most
lucrative—and realistic—two-member coalition, mainly because the
bulk of revenues comes from mackerel. Weakening such rational-
ity protects the less profitable species. Again, upon relaxing the re-
strictions on escapement, the difference between cooperation and
competition becomes even greater. 
Monetary benefits – supported by side payments – are displayed
in Table 2 . In reality, up-front agreements are frequently modi-
fied thereafter by bilateral quota transfers - or by access to other
exclusive zones. Moreover, total allowable catches are often de-
cided stock-by-stock. Regrettably, such procedures rarely facilitate
cooperation - or outright, they block it. Yet the preceding analysis
shows that, although cooperative costs and benefits be unevenly
distributed, there is ample room to satisfy each party. Here, Ice-
land, being a ”fringe player,” faces relatively low costs of effort s but
low prices for landings. By contrast, Norway - with higher costs
and prices - gains most from full or partial cooperation. For UK
and Iceland, the cooperative incentives are less clear cut. This in-
dicates that Norway - to entice or incentivize cooperation - should
transfer some of its gains. 
We indicate some second-best alternatives, realized rather by
quota transfers. For that, we re-run the cooperative instance with
the added restriction that UK and Iceland should receive no less
payoff than their best alternatives, which for Iceland is under full
competition, and for UK in a bilateral coalition with Norway. The
main message is that Norway should—in some form or to some
approximation—“take over” the unprofitable Icelandic herring fish-
ery. In return, Iceland should harvest more blue whiting. In fact,
UK must give Iceland its blue whiting quota, in return for a part of
the mackerel quota. Table 6 exhibits the attending quota transfers
alongside the cooperative and competitive payments, reproduced
from Table 2 . With such “simple means”, all nations improve over
the fully competitive scenario. Compared with the unstable, first-
best regime of full cooperation, the total revenue drops by merely
2%. Moreover, total stock sizes and harvest quantities are almost
unchanged. Only the harvest (or quota) distribution between na-
tions is altered. So, modulo modest quota transfers, a desirable but
notoriously unstable first-best solution, yields a stable second-best
solution, almost as efficient. 
9. Concluding remarks 
Motivated by multi-species, multi-nation fisheries, we have
viewed various regimes as discounted, dynamic games. By com-
paring their steady states, bones of contention are identified - and
prospects for improvement become clearer. 
In particular, fully cooperative behavior may serve then as
benchmark and focal point. Often though, such management is no-
toriously unstable, markedly specialized – and at variance with bi-logical diversity. Yet, in our leading case, we find that minor quota
ransfers may, to tolerable approximation, yield efficiency and sta-
ility. Attending transfers, observed in reality, can substitute for
onetary side payments. Incentives for walking that line derive
rom the fact that partial cooperation can occasionally prove worse
han none at all. And clearly, by comprehensive agreements on re-
llocations and take-outs, the parties can circumvent the deadlocks
f species-by-species management and bilateral deals. 
Further, the optimal cooperative solution entails specialization
oth between agents and with respect to stocks, which may be
nfavorable for biodiversity. In fact, the suboptimal fully compet-
tive situation may, modulo quota transfers, be the one that best
reserves a balanced composition of stocks. 
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ppendix 
The appendix presents the relevant data and estimation statis-
ics behind the parameters introduced in Section 6, Table 1 , as well
s the background for scaling of UK and Iceland costs and price to
orways’, and the details of the sensitivity analysis. 
arameter estimation 
Ecological parameters. Our goal here is to model the fisheries by
rawing on empirically based information without having to rely
n comprehensive econometric studies of the market and harvest-
ng processes. 
Scaling of costs and prices. According to Lappo (2013) , UK ves-
els had higher costs, 39–79% per tonne landed over the years
008–2010, compared to Norwegian vessels. Icelandic vessels had
he lowest costs, 43–48% less compared to the Norwegian purse
eine vessels. Regarding profits per tonne landed, the order was
ice versa. UK vessels earned on average 48–270% higher profits
er tonne than Norwegian vessels. Generally, the Icelandic vessels
ere the least profitable. The Icelandic profits varied from being
% higher to being 74% lower, compared to the Norwegian purse
eine vessel’s profits. Further, UK fishing vessels achieved about
5% lower price on herring compared with Norwegian vessels and
bout 12.5% less on mackerel, but 33% higher prices on blue whit-
ng than the Norwegians. Icelandic vessels, on the other hand,
chieved lower price on all three species compared with Norwe-
ian prices. More specifically, the Icelandic prices were 57%, 75%,
nd 23%, lower than the Norwegian prices on herring, mackerel,
nd blue whiting, respectively ( Lappo, 2013 ). 
The fact that costs and prices appear to vary between coun-
ries may seem somewhat puzzling, and the explanation for it may
e complex. Important factors are differences in fisheries manage-
ent and fishing industry structure between countries. Take, for
nstance, Norway and Iceland: As to the structure of the Icelandic
ndustry, the government in 1991 adopted new legislation allow-
ng full transfer of quotas between companies. This caused a major
hange in the structure of the Icelandic industry and the major-
ty of resources are now concentrated in a few big vertically in-
egrated companies ( Kvalvik, Nøstvold, & Young, 2014 ). In Norway,
n the other hand, legislation hinders vertical integration, and with
 few exceptions, no company has control over the full value chain.
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Table A1 
The 1998–2010 operation costs (billion NOK) of the licensed Norwegian purse seine fishery; Norwegian purse seiners catch; 
and total escapement levels (thousand tonnes), respectively, of herring, mackerel, and blue whiting; and the Norwegian con- 
sumer price index (CPI). 
Norwegian 
purse seine 
Norwegian purse seine catch ( h snt ) Escapement ( X st ) Norwegian 
Year Costs Herring Mackerel Blue whiting Herring Mackerel Blue whiting CPI 
1998 1691 363 103 434 4120 1476 2119 0,78 
1999 1700 383 111 474 4610 1556 1820 0,79 
2000 1977 381 122 465 4426 1434 1707 0,82 
2001 2377 235 127 496 4417 1436 1527 0,84 
2002 2436 238 129 455 5281 1144 2621 0,85 
2003 2122 213 117 710 5257 1290 2205 0,88 
2004 2389 235 111 827 5612 1028 2621 0,88 
2005 2555 301 81 819 6751 1238 2699 0,89 
2006 2223 292 82 524 6913 1442 2625 0,91 
2007 2489 441 91 456 6306 1561 2687 0,92 
2008 2669 517 83 363 6445 1630 2400 0,96 
2009 2580 513 86 181 6480 1835 2646 0,98 
2010 2867 440 167 165 6061 1735 2907 1,00 
Table A2 
Results from fitting a multi-species logistic growth 
model to stock and harvest data a . 
Species Herring Mackerel Blue whiting 
Parameters 
r s .358 .589 .808 
(.089) b (.133) (.193) 
k 27,462 c 
(6,925) 
a Stock and harvest data for 1998–2010, as treated and 
presented in ( Ekerhovd & Steinshamn, 2016 ). 
b Standard errors in parentheses. 
c Thousand tonnes. 
Table A3 
Results from calibrating the cost func- 
tion parameters, c n , of the Norwegian 






Blue whiting 1,154,117 
(1,699,684) 
a Norwegian Kroner (NOK). Standard 



































c  he fact that the Icelandic industry is dominated by vertically in-
egrated companies implies that Icelandic companies maximize the
rofit of the vertically integrated chain. In Norway the vessel own-
rs are maximizing vessel profit. This may in part explain why the
rst hand (quay side) prices in Norway are higher than in Ice-Table A4 
Sensitivity analysis of cost differences. Varying UK
counted profits 10 6 NOK a over 20 year for various co
UK’s cost factor 1.1 
Country b NO UK ICE 
Coalition structure 
Fully cooperative 509.5 0.5 −11.0 
(ICE,UK),(NO) 48.4 5.7 0.2 
(ICE,NO),(UK) 60.2 3.2 1.2 
(UK,NO),(ICE) 142.9 0.8 0.6 
Fully non-cooperative 52.2 2.8 1.6 
a Norwegian kroner (NOK) 
b Norway (No), United Kingdom (UK), and Iceland and. Furthermore, in Iceland the fishing quotas are concentrated
n fewer vessels than in Norway meaning that landings per vessel
re substantially higher for Icelandic vessels than for Norwegian
essels. This may explain why Norwegian vessels have higher cost
er tonne landed than Icelandic vessels. 
Taking this information into account, keeping in mind that in
ur model costs are defined per unit of effort, not per tonne
anded, we scaled UK and Icelandic costs and prices to the Nor-
egian parameters presented in Table 1 . 
ensitivity analysis 
In the main analysis we have used zero discounting. We wish
o compare this with a 10% discount rate. A change in the discount
ate is not expected to affect the competitive case or the single-
ons, as in this case all agents are myopic, and discounting cannot
ake them more myopic than they already are. 
It is, therefore, the cooperative case that is of most interest.
irst, we notice that the distribution of harvest between countries
s not affected. Iceland is still only catching herring, the catch is in-
reased by 17%, and Iceland still harvests with loss. Norway catches
nly mackerel as before, and more or less the same amount too.
K catches blue whiting as before, and also here the catch is in-
reased by 17%. The steady state stock levels decrease marginally
between 2% and 12%). In other words, fairly small consequences of
0% discounting compared to zero. A bit higher harvest and lower
tocks are as expected when discounting increases. 
The cost per unit effort is assumed to be the same between
pecies, due to similar technology, but vary between nations. In
he main analysis Norway and UK have the same cost whereas Ice-
and has 50% lower cost. As Norway already is the most profitable
ountry, we do not see any point in reducing its cost. Instead, we’s cost factor by 10%, certeris paribus . Undis- 
alition structures. 
0.9 
Total NO UK ICE Total 
498.9 509.6 2.7 −11.6 500.7 
54.3 22.5 20 0 42.5 
64.6 25.6 14.9 0.6 41.1 
144.3 143.2 2.2 0.3 145.7 
56.6 25.4 16.6 0.4 42.4 
(ICE). 
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Table A5 
Sensitivity analysis of cost differences. Varying Iceland’s cost factor by 10%, certeris paribus . Undiscounted 
profits 10 6 NOK a over 20 year for various coalition structures. 
Iceland’s cost factor 0.55 0.45 
Country b NO UK ICE Total NO UK ICE Total 
Coalition structure 
Fully cooperative 509.3 1.8 −13.9 497.2 509.8 1.8 −9.4 502.2 
(ICE,UK),(NO) 38 10.6 0 48.6 31 10.6 1.4 43 
(ICE,NO),(UK) 42 7.8 0.6 48.6 42.1 7 1.2 50.3 
(UK,NO),(ICE) 166.7 1.8 0.1 168.6 116.7 0.9 1.3 118.9 
Fully non-cooperative 41.7 8.2 0.6 50.5 35.2 6.6 2.8 44.6 
a Norwegian kroner (NOK) 













































































MIT Press . varied the UK and Icelandic cost factors, one at the time, ceteris
paribus , by 10%. The results, comparable to Table 2 , are presented
in Tables A4 and A5 for UK and Iceland, respectively. 
For mackerel, Norway goes from a fixed price of NOK 9.48 to a
demand function given by 
p(h ) = 11 . 8 − 0 . 002 · h. 
This means that for a catch equal to 1.16 million tonnes, the price
is the same as the fixed price. 
We look at the two extreme cases, namely full competition and
full cooperation. In the competitive case, hardly anything changes
with respect to herring and blue whiting. Also for mackerel the
effect is relatively small. It is seen that market power leads Norway
to harvest more mackerel and not less. Norway’s harvest goes from
round 650 to 715 thousand tonnes. The reason for this is that this
is on the elastic part of the linear demand function. 
In the cooperative case, on the other hand, market power im-
plies change in the harvest distribution for mackerel, but no effect
on total harvest, total stock or on the other two species. The har-
vest distribution of mackerel is changed such that instead of Nor-
way harvesting close to 3 million tonnes, now UK harvest 2.15 mil-
lion tonnes and Norway only 800 thousand tonnes. The reason is,
of course, that a harvest around 800 thousand tonnes gives Nor-
way a price close to NOK 9.9 whereas the old harvest of almost 3
million tonnes would give a price equal to NOK 5.5. 
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